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DOES DELEGATION INCREASE WORKER TRAINING?
CHRISTOS BILANAKOS, JOHN S. HEYWOOD, JOHN G. SESSIONS and NIKOLAOS THEODOROPOULOS∗Q1
We model a principal-firm offering training to its agent worker under two alter-
native organizational structures: integration, where the principal retains authority to
overrule the investment project recommended by the worker; and delegation, where the
principal cannot overrule the worker’s preferred investment project. We assume that
training reduces the worker’s effort cost of assembling information about alternative
projects’ payoffs and identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit-
maximizing intensity of training. Empirical estimates frommatched employer–employee
data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training. This
result persists in two cross sections, in panel fixed-effect estimates and, critically, in an
instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects. (JEL
D21, D22, D23, M53, M54)
I. INTRODUCTION
Delegation of decision-making allows
employers to capture the superior knowledge
and information of workers. The objective func-
tions of workers, however, may differ sharply
from those of their employers. This tradeoff
between enhanced information and misaligned
incentives lies at the heart of a growing litera-
ture claiming that delegation and incentives are
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complementary—the more authority delegated
to workers, the stronger must be the incentives
for workers to align their objectives with those
of their employer.
We uniquely provide a theoretical illustra-
tion and supporting empirical evidence showing
that delegation increases employee training. We
extendAghion and Tirole’s (1997) seminal model
to recognize that a worker’s effort cost of acquir-
ing superior information can be reduced through
the provision of training. We compare the profit-
maximizing training intensity under two alterna-
tive organizational structures: integration, where
the firm retains the ability to overrule the invest-
ment project recommended by the worker; and
delegation, where the firm cannot overrule the
worker’s preferred investment project.
Ourmodel predicts that the firm providesmore
training under delegation than under integration if
the preferences of the firm and the worker are suf-
ficiently congruent. This reflects the key trade-off
from delegation. The worker is induced to supply
more effort in acquiring information but the firm
loses control and risks its preferred investment
project not being implemented. When the firm
ABBREVIATIONS
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2 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
benefits similarly from its own preferred project
and from that of the worker, the effort-enhancing
effect of delegation dominates the loss-of-control
effect and this makes additional training a prof-
itable investment.
In an Appendix, we add training to a richer
model in which incentive pay is also an option
to foster the agent’s effort. We again show that
training can be a profitable investment under
delegation and partially characterize the opti-
mal intensity of training, wage incentives and
effort under each authority structure (integration
and delegation), while leaving the full treatment
of the relationship between these variables for
future research.
We impose delegation or integration exoge-
nously in our model. This seems appropriate in
situations where, for example, more senior man-
agement may require certain types of delegation,
or where an external hire imposes delegation
practices in a way that is unrelated to the firms’
training practices. There may also be structural
differences across industries that make delega-
tion more likely—something we exploit in our
instrumental variable (IV) strategy in Section
V.C. Within this framework, our nonequilib-
rium approach of looking at integration and
delegation separately provides a sensible and
testable association between delegation and
training.
We test the prediction of our theoretical model
using large British matched employer–employee
cross sections and an associated panel. We find
that those establishments which delegate more,
with workers greatly influencing their own tasks,
offer more training. This persists across a variety
of specifications, alternative sample restrictions
and using alternative definitions of both dele-
gation and training. It persists in establishment
fixed-effect estimates, under alternative func-
tional forms and in reasonable IV estimates that
also control for workplace fixed effects.1 The
empirical relationship between delegation and
training appears remarkably durable.
Our investigation remains pertinent as dele-
gation and decentralization of decision-making
within firms have become increasingly common
since the late 1970s, being most evident in Scan-
dinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries (Aghion,
Bloom, and VanReenen 2014).2 This growth in
1. We refer to the terms “firm,” “workplace,” and “estab-
lishment” interchangeably throughout the paper.
2. Empirical studies discussing the growth of delega-
tion and its consequences include Osterman (1994), Caroli,
Greenan, and Guellec (2001), and Rajan and Wulf (2006).
actual delegation has been matched by a recent
literature on the relationship between incentives
and delegation, which we summarize in the
next section.
In what follows, Section II sets our study in the
context of related literature. Section III provides
the theoretical framework and identifies the con-
ditions under which delegation increases train-
ing. Section IV discusses the data and empiri-
cal methodology. Section V presents empirical
results and provides robustness checks. Section
VI concludes and offers suggestions for fur-
ther research.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Our research fits a strand of literature that
models pairs of human resource practices search-
ing for complements or substitutes—see, for
example, Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002). This
allows more tractable theoretical models and
cleaner empirical predictions.3 We examine the
pair of delegation and training. The study of these
practices has generated two extensive but distinct
literatures. To our knowledge, we are the first to
examine delegation of authority as a determinant
of training.
In this section, we briefly review the research
on delegation and incentives that we extend to
include the training decision. Theoretical work
views the choice of delegation in terms of infor-
mation and control. Delegating authority can be
beneficial because workers know more about
their day-to-day tasks than their employer. Yet,
workers’ objectives can differ from those of their
employer. This tradeoff between information and
objectives exists because the agent does not fully
communicate private information when the prin-
cipal retains authority. This arises because of
bounded rationality (Jensen and Meckling 1992)
or because of the agent’s strategic use of informa-
tion (Holmstrom 1984).
Grossman and Hart (1986) observe that
authority might follow from a contract that allo-
cates decision rights within the organization (see
also Hart and Moore 1990). Such formal author-
ity, however, does not always coincide with real
authority, the effective control over decision-
making. Aghion and Tirole (1997)—hereafter
3. Another strand of the literature investigates how a com-
prehensive collection of human resource practices influences
productivity. This literature is uniformly empirical—see, for
example, Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997).
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AT—explore this tension between real and for-
mal authority and its implications for delegation.
They recognize that information provision can
be a critical yet noncontractible relation-specific
investment.
AT model a principal-firm and an agent-
worker who together implement a single
investment project. The firm tasks the worker
with assembling information regarding the
expected payoffs across an array of potential
projects. The firm selects from two alternative
organizational structures: integration, whereby
the firm maintains formal authority over invest-
ment decisions and can ignore the worker’s
recommendation as to the “best” investment
project; and delegation, whereby the worker
selects a particular project and cannot be
overruled. AT show that delegating authority
encourages the worker to work harder in ascer-
taining which project should be implemented.
However, this higher effort comes with a loss
of control and an increased likelihood that the
chosen project fails to maximize the firm’s
payoff. Which effect dominates depends upon
how congruent are the objectives of the firm
and worker. The less their objectives coincide,
the more likely will the loss of control effect
dominate and the more likely will the firm retain
formal authority.
We expand AT by imagining that the firm
can invest in training. This training lowers the
cost of information acquisition by the worker
and makes delegation particularly effective in
providing superior information.We show that this
is a profitable investment when objectives are
sufficiently congruent.
Several papers have, like us, developed exten-
sions to AT’s framework. Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy (1999) argue that even though delega-
tion can only ever be informal, it might remain
in equilibrium due to reputational concerns.
Hart and Holmstrom (2010) and Bolton and
Dewatripont (2013) also stress that delega-
tion may persist despite the typical ability of
the principal to reverse a delegation decision.
Zabojnik (2002) argues that it is less costly to
motivate an agent to work on their own project
rather than on the principal’s project, while De
Paola and Scoppa (2006) investigate the costs
and benefits of delegation within a framework
where the principal cannot observe the agent’s
effort. In both cases, delegation persists as
a feasible outcome when the loss of control
implied by delegation proves less costly for
the principal than the loss of information under
centralization.4
Estimation by Aghion, Bloom, and VanRee-
nen (2014) confirms that the congruence of
preferences (as proxied by trust) helps determine
delegation. Itoh, Kikutani, and Hayashida (2008)
show that delegation from core to affiliated
Japanese firms is associated with incentives
for accountability. Nagar (2002), Colombo and
Delmastro (2004), Foss and Laursen (2005) and
De Varo and Kurtulus (2010) demonstrate that
incentive payments for managers and for workers
are associated with delegation. Yet, De Varo and
Prasad (2015) argue that noisy incentive pay may
induce risk-averse agents to select suboptimal
tasks. For instance, surgeons may not operate on
high-risk patients. They confirm that delegation
and incentives are positively correlated for sim-
ple jobs but negatively correlated for complex
jobs (where task selection is valuable). Lo et al.
(2016) show that sales employees with higher
tenure and skills are delegated more pricing
authority even as uncertain product markets
make delegation less likely.
While the evidence is not monolithic, we
incorporate the issues of these studies into
our testing. In robustness checks, we examine
whether the influence of delegation on training
varies with the presence of incentive schemes.
If incentive schemes facilitate delegation by
increasing the congruence of interests, they may
also make training more valuable to the firm.
Put differently, training becomes more profitable
when it is more likely to be used in the interest of
the firm. We will also experiment with the role
of an uncertain market environment.
As a last note, delegation may simply be
critical for firm success. Bloom, Sadun, and
VanReenen (2012b) show that failure to del-
egate authority (often resulting from lack of
trust) impedes firm growth. Boedker et al.
(2011) find that of 32 practices, delegation
correlates most closely with their “High Per-
forming Workplace Index.” More generally,
researchers emphasize that appropriate delega-
tion reflects successful management (Garicano
4. Bester and Krahmer (2008) also vary AT by model-
ing a situation in which the agent’s job is to complete rather
than to identify a project, showing that delegation becomes
less attractive in this case. In another extension, Stein (2002)
argues that delegation is most likely to dominate when infor-
mation is “soft”—that is, not verifiable. Relatedly, Dessein
(2002) builds a model with asymmetric information to show
that delegation might be the most efficient way for the prin-
cipal to extract the agent’s private knowledge on projects’
payoffs.
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4 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
and Rayo 2016) and generates productivity
differences across firms and countries (Bloom
et al. 2012a). As a consequence, we adopt an
empirical strategy that tries to rule out threats to
the independent role that we argue delegation can
play. We want to avoid presenting correlations
that simply reflect that superior management
more likely both delegates and trains
workers.
We use matched employer–employee data
to estimate the determinants of firm-sponsored
training. Such estimates frequently focus on
the role of competition in labor and product
markets (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999;
Manning 2003).5 While Brunello and Gam-
barotto (2007) confirm that employers provide
less training in more competitive labor mar-
kets, Bilanakos et al. (2017) find that product
market dominance strengthens investment in
training. We will account for such determi-
nants when focusing on the role of delegation.
We are aware of no papers that relate training
to delegation and only one paper that relates
(exogenous) human capital to the degree of dele-
gation within a firm.6 While building from these
previous works, we test whether the delegation of
decision-making authority plays an independent
role in an establishment’s choice of training
intensity.
III. THEORETICAL MODEL
A. Setup
We consider a principal-owner, P, and an
agent-employee, A, who either implement a sin-
gle investment project or choose to do nothing.
P tasks A with collecting information about the
payoffs of n> 3 potential and a priori ostensi-
bly identical projects. The principal’s gross profit
associated with each project k∈ {1, 2, … , n} is
Bk and the agent’s corresponding private benefit
(whichmay include on-the-job perks or the possi-
bility of signaling his ability) is bk. These payoffs
5. For empirical evidence on the determinants of firm-
sponsored general training see, for example, Katz and Zider-
man (1990), Krueger (1993), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998),
and Booth and Bryan (2005).
6. De Paola and Scoppa (2006) argue that delegation,
thanks to on-the-job learning and the possible expropria-
tion of resources, might well increase an agent’s outside
option. This increase, in turn, might increase the quit propen-
sity of the agent and thus the turnover costs of the firm.
Thus, firms should be less likely to delegate the higher are
turnover costs and the lower the degree of firm specific human
capital.
do not take into account any wage payments
from P to A. The case where P and A do noth-
ing is summarized in a “project zero” yielding
payoffs B0 = b0 = 0.7 The principal reaps B> 0
from her preferred project while the agent reaps
b> 0 from his own preferred project. The agent’s
benefit from P’s preferred project is βb and the
principal’s profit from A’s preferred project is
αB, where a , β∈ (0, 1] are exogenous congru-
ence parameters.
The principal chooses the level of training, I,
to provide the agent. The training cost incurred
by P is c(I) with c
′
(0)= 0, c′ (I)> 0 and c′′ (I)> 0
for I > 0. Both the principal and the agent are ini-
tially unaware of the payoffs from the various
projects. P acquires perfect information regard-
ing the payoffs of all projects with exogenous
probability E but remains ignorant with probabil-
ity 1−E. A chooses effort e devoted to acquir-
ing information about the projects’ payoffs and
becomes perfectly informed with probability e
but learns nothing with probability 1− e. We
assume that training reduces the agent’s marginal
effort cost as captured in the effort cost func-
tion g(e, I) with ∂g/∂e> 0, ∂2g/∂e2 > 0, ∂g/∂I < 0,
and ∂2g/∂e∂I < 0.8 Since our formulation primar-
ily intends to motivate the empirical analysis
rather than suggest a general and thorough exten-
sion of AT’s model, we ease analytical exposi-
tion by assuming the specific functional forms
c(I)=θI2/2 and g(e, I)=ρe2/2I (with θ> 0 and
ρ> 0) throughout this section. This illustrative
example sheds light on the main tradeoffs asso-
ciated with delegation and allows reaching a
closed-form solution.
The principal pays a wage w≥ 0 to the agent,
who faces a fixed outside option represented
by his reservation utility u. (Appendix A shows
how the model can be extended to incorporate
incentive pay). We follow AT by considering
7. We also assume that for each party, there exists at least
one project generating a loss of such magnitude that both P
and A prefer inaction to implementing a random project in
the absence of information about payoffs.
8. The assumption that the cross derivative of g(·) has a
negative sign—that is, that A’s marginal cost of becoming
informed decreases with training—is a critical driving force
of our results, since it implies that training is complemen-
tary to effort and therefore generates the rationale for posi-
tive human capital investment on the part of the employer.
In essence, our formulation assumes that training increases
the worker’s productive efficiency in acquiring information
about projects’ payoffs. While acknowledging the possibility
of alternative specifications, we consider such a conceptual-
ization of training as a productivity-enhancing (or, equiva-
lently, cost-reducing) investment to be reasonable.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
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FIGURE 1
Time Sequence of Actions
integration (n) and delegation (d). Under integra-
tion, P can overrule A’s recommendation and, if
informed, adopt her preferred project. Under del-
egation, P cannot overrule A’s recommendation
and optimally accepts it since α> 0. Of course,
an uninformed agent will accept P’s proposal (if
any) given that β> 0. Since the projects cannot
be contracted upon ex ante, the model follows
Grossman andHart’s (1986) incomplete contract-
ing approach. Specifically, the initial contract
allocates formal authority to either P or A and
the overall sequence of actions is described in
Figure 1.
Under integration, the payoffs of P and A, unp
and unA respectively, are given by:
(1) unp = E · B + (1 − E) e · aB − c (I) − w
(2) unA = E · βb + (1 − E) e · b + w − g (e, I) .
The payoffs associated with delegation are:
(3) udP = e · aB + (1 − e)E · B − c (I) − w
(4) udA = e · b + (1 − e)E · βb + w − g (e, I) .
B. Equilibrium
The model is solved recursively under each
authority structure (integration and delegation).
In both cases, we first characterize A’s optimal
effort given the wage and training level. Then,
we move back to identify the profit-maximizing
training intensity and wage anticipating the
worker’s optimal effort and taking into account
the latter’s participation constraint. Finally, we
establish the conditions under which P optimally
selects to delegate formal authority to A.
CASE 1. Integration
Under integration, the agent chooses e∈ [0, 1]
so as to maximize unA and the associated first-
order condition is:
(5) ∂unA∕∂e = (1 − E) b − (∂g∕∂e) = 0.
Given our assumed functional forms, this con-
dition implies the solution:
(6) e∗ (I) = min {(1 − E) bI∕ρ, 1} .
The agent contributes more effort the higher
is his private benefit (∂e*/∂b> 0) and the lower
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6 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
is the probability that P becomes informed
(∂e*/∂E< 0). Importantly, an increase in train-
ing induces A to work harder (∂e*/∂I > 0)—by
reducing his marginal cost of effort—that is,
training is complementary to effort in this setting.
The principal anticipates e*(I) and chooses
the level of training, In, and the wage, wn, that
maximize her payoff subject to A’s participa-
tion constraint:
max
{I,w}
unp = E · B + (1 − E) e
∗ (I) · aB − c (I) − w
s.t. unA = E · βb + (1 − E) e
∗ (I) · b
+w − g
(
e∗ (I) , I
)
≥ u (PC) .
Letting μ1 denote the multiplier of PC in the
associated Lagrangian (L1) and assuming an inte-
rior solution (w> 0 and 0< e* < 1), the first-order
conditions with respect to I and w are:
∂L1∕∂I = (1 − E) ·
(
∂e∗∕∂I
)
· aB − c′ (I)(7)
+ μ1 ·
(
∂unA(e
∗ (I) , I,w)∕∂I
)
= 0
(8) ∂L1∕∂w = −1 + μ1 = 0.
Since μ1 = 1> 0, the participation constraint
will be binding at the optimal solution implying
that P can use the wage to extract any variation
in the surplus due to training. In Equation (7),
the first term is P’s marginal benefit associ-
ated with the positive impact of training on A’s
effort incentives while the second term is sim-
ply the marginal cost of training. Since ∂unA∕∂I =
(1 − E)2 b2∕2ρ > 0, training raises A’s utility and
the third term in Equation (7) shows that P has
stronger training incentives when taking A’s par-
ticipation considerations into account. The solu-
tion of the above problem yields In and wn which
can then be substituted into e*(I) to derive the
level of effort, en, as summarized in Equation (9):
(In,wn, en) =
(
(1 − E)2 b (2aB + b) ∕2θρ,(9)
u − Eβb −
(
b2 (1 − E)2 In
)
∕2ρ, ((1 − E) bIn)∕ρ
)
.
The above expression evidently shows that
training and wages are treated as substitutes by
P, since the provision of more training enables
the principal to lower the wage while keeping A’s
participation constraint satisfied.9
9. The outcome in Equation (9) holds for
θ> θn ≡ b2(1−E)3(2aB+ b)/2ρ2 (so that en < 1) and
sufficiently high values of uto ensure that wn > 0.
CASE 2. Delegation
When formal authority is delegated to A, the
latter chooses e∈ [0, 1] so as to maximize udA and
the first-order condition is written as:
(10) ∂udA∕∂e = (1 − βE) b − (∂g∕∂e) = 0.
The solution yields the optimal effort function:
(11) ê (I) = min {((1 − βE) bI∕ρ) , 1}
where ∂ê∕∂b > 0, ∂ê∕∂E < 0 (as before) and
∂ê∕∂β < 0 (since a higher β increases A’s pay-
off from implementing P’s preferred project
and so dampens A’s incentive to become
informed himself). The impact of training
on effort is again positive but stronger than
under integration
(
∂ê∕∂I > ∂e∗∕∂I
)
. Compar-
ing the optimal effort choices also reveals that
ê (I) > e∗ (I). Given the training level, A faces the
same marginal effort cost under either authority
structure but reaps a higher marginal benefit
under delegation (since(1−βE)b> (1−E)b) and
thus has stronger incentives to become informed
in this case.
Anticipating the new optimal choice ê (I), P
now selects the training intensity, Id, and the
wage, wd, which solve the following problem:
max
{I,w}
udp = ê (I) · aB +
(
1 − ê (I)
)
· EB − c (I) − w
s.t. udA = ê (I) · b +
(
1 − ê (I)
)
· Eβb
+w − g
(
ê (I) , I
)
≥ u
(
PC′
)
.
Denoting by μ2 the multiplier of PC in the
associated Lagrangian (L2) and assuming again
an interior solution, the first-order conditions
with respect to I and w become:
∂L2∕∂I =
(
∂ê∕∂I
)
· aB −
(
∂ê∕∂I
)
· EB − c′ (I)
(12)
+ μ2 ·
(
∂udA (̂e (I) , I,w)∕∂I
)
= 0
(13) ∂L2∕∂w = −1 + μ2 = 0.
As before, μ2 = 1> 0 and the participation
constraint binds at the optimal solution. In
Equation (12), the term
(
∂ê∕∂I
)
· aB repre-
sents P’s marginal benefit from training due
to fostering A’s effort incentives. Yet, the
term
(
∂ê∕∂I
)
· EB represents a marginal cost
associated with the reduced likelihood that P
receives B from her own preferred project and
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c
′
(I) is the marginal cost of training. Since
∂udA∕∂I = b
2 (1 − βE)2 ∕2ρ > ∂unA∕∂I, training
increases A’s utility relatively more under del-
egation and P takes this stronger effect into
account when choosing the level of human
capital investment. Solving for Id and wd and
substituting back into ê (I) to derive the effort
level, ed, we finally obtain10:Q5
(14)
(
Id,wd, ed
)
=
{(
0, u − Eβb, 0
)
, if a ≤ a0 ≡ E − b (1 − βE) ∕2B(
b(1−βE)[2(a−E)B+b(1−βE)]
2θρ , u − Eβb −
b2(1−βE)2Id
2ρ ,
b(1−βE)Id
ρ
)
, if a ≥ a0
C. The Impact of Delegation on Training
Intensity
The outcomes derived in Equations (9) and
(14) can be compared to state the following
Proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. When formal authority is
delegated, the equilibrium training and effort
intensity as well as the wage level can be either
higher or lower than under integration. In
particular:
i. Id < In for a ∈
(
0, â
)
and Id > In for a ∈(
â, 1
]
ii. ed < en for a ∈ (0, ã) and ed > en for a ∈
(ã, 1]
iii. wd >wn for a ∈
(
0, a
)
and wd <wn for
a ∈
(
a, 1
]
where 0 < a ≡
2BE(1−βE)3−b
[
(1−βE)4−(1−E)4
]
2B
[
(1−βE)3−(1−E)4
] <
ã ≡
2BE(1−βE)2−b
[
(1−βE)3−(1−E)3
]
2B
[
(1−βE)2−(1−E)3
] <
â ≡
2BE(1−βE)−b
[
(1−βE)2−(1−E)2
]
2B
[
(1−βE)−(1−E)2
] < 1.
The intuition underpinning Proposition 1 can
be understood by also investigating the condi-
tions under which the principal optimally chooses
to delegate authority. For this purpose, we write
P’s payoffs under integration and delegation as:
unp = E · B + (1 − E) e
n · aB − c (In) − wn(15)
= E (B + βb) − u + θ (In)2 ∕2
10. The results in Equation (14) hold for
θ> θd ≡ b2(1−βE)2[2(a−E)B+ b(1−βE)/2ρ2 (so that
ed < 1), B> b(1−βE)/2E (implying α0 > 0) and high enough
values of u guaranteeing wd > 0.
udp = e
d · aB +
(
1 − ed
)
· EB − c
(
Id
)
− wd
(16)
= E (B + βb) − u + θ
(
Id
)2 ∕2.
This reformulation, combined with part (i) of
Proposition 1, immediately leads to the following
result.
PROPOSITION 2. The principal prefers dele-
gation if and only if the congruence parameter
α is sufficiently high: udp < u
n
p for a ∈
(
0, â
)
and
udp > u
n
p for a ∈
(
â, 1
]
.
The central tradeoff associated with delega-
tion here is the same as in AT’s seminal model.
Delegation induces A to work harder (given the
training intensity) and thus tends to increase P’s
expected payoff (this is the incentive effect). At
the same time, however, it may lead to the selec-
tion of projects which are less preferred by P (this
is the loss-of-control effect). When the congru-
ence parameter α is sufficiently high—that is,
when A’s preferred project yields a large enough
benefit to P—the incentive effect dominates and
P chooses delegation. In our formulation, train-
ing is complementary to effort and proportionally
amplifies this tradeoff. Therefore, the conditions
under which delegation and training are posi-
tively related are identical to those determining
whether P delegates authority or not (as con-
firmed by inspection of Proposition 2 and part (i)
of Proposition 1).11
The top panel of Figure 2 graphically depicts
the relationship between Id and In, whereas the
middle panel shows the relationship between ed
and en. Since the positive impact of α on train-
ing and effort is relatively stronger under del-
egation, the curves Id(a) and ed(a) are steeper
than In(a) and en(a) and therefore the training and
effort intensities under delegation exceed those
under integration beyond the threshold values â
and ã, respectively. The bottom panel of Figure 2
plots the wage levels under each authority struc-
ture. Increasing α induces more training in both
cases, thereby enhancing A’s utility and lowering
11. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for illumi-
nating this identity.
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FIGURE 2
The Top Panel Shows Training Intensity, the
Middle Panel Shows Worker’s Effort and the
Bottom Panel Shows the Wage Level with and
Without Delegation
the wage necessary to satisfy A’s participation
constraint. The curve wd(a), however, falls faster
thanwn(a) implying that P pays a relatively lower
wage under delegation when α exceeds the cut-
off level a. More generally, our analysis makes
clear that the impact of delegation on training is
ambiguous and depends on the critical congru-
ence parameter, thus fueling our empirical esti-
mates to identify the dominant pattern.12
IV. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
In what follows we detail our data and present
our methodology for examining the influence of
delegation on training.We stress the potential dif-
ficulties introduced by using linked data and the
need to hold constant unmeasured establishment
specific influences. We also emphasize the need
to account for potential endogeneity. In line with
our theoretical model, the objective is to get as
close as possible to a test of the exogenous influ-
ence of delegation.
A. Workplace Employment Relations Surveys
Data
We draw data from the 2004 and 2011 Work-
place Employment Relations Surveys (WERS).
The surveys randomly select UKworkplaces with
five or more employees from the Interdepart-
mental Business Register, considered the highest
quality available sampling frame. A smaller panel
exists of establishments responding in both sur-
veys. The sampling stratifies by workplace size
and industry with larger workplaces and some
industries overrepresented (Chaplin et al. 2005).
As a consequence, all the estimates we present
use workplace weights (separate weights exist
for the cross sections and panel) to ensure that
the results are nationally representative of British
workplaces.13 The sampling weights adjust for
a number of factors influencing the probability
of selection, and the stratification by workplace
size and industry (see Kersley et al. 2006). We
exclude establishments not in the trading sec-
tor (government and nonprofits) and those with
missing data on the critical dependent variable
12. Appendix A extends our model by introducing incen-
tive pay as an additional instrument available to the firm, thus
enabling the latter to use both training and the appropriate
design of wage incentives to elicit more productive effort from
the worker.
13. We have experimented with employment weights and
the results remain robust.
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TABLE 1
Distribution of Training
WERS 2004 WERS 2011 Panel 2004–2011
M SD Obs. M SD Obs. M SD Obs.
None (0%) 0.237 0.426 131 0.190 0.393 112 0.174 0.380 53
Just a few (1%–19%) 0.152 0.359 163 0.149 0.356 127 0.191 0.394 80
Some (20%–39%) 0.010 0.300 127 0.099 0.299 109 0.087 0.282 55
Around half (40%–59%) 0.099 0.298 99 0.069 0.254 90 0.099 0.298 54
Most (60%–79%) 0.058 0.234 80 0.051 0.219 79 0.075 0.264 39
Almost all (80%–99%) 0.063 0.243 118 0.093 0.290 130 0.081 0.274 50
All (100%) 0.291 0.454 276 0.349 0.477 365 0.293 0.455 143
Total observations 994 1,012 474
Notes: The training question reads as follows: “What proportion of experienced employees in the largest occupational group
have been given time off from their normal daily work duties to undertake training over the past 12months?” The two cross-
section samples consist of private trading sector workplaces and exclude workplaces where the largest occupational group is
managerial/senior official staff as the training question does not apply to this group. For the panel dataset, we apply the same
restriction as in the two cross sections and keep workplaces we observe twice. Thus, the panel is balanced, and we observe 237
workplaces generating 474 observations. Means are weighted using workplace weights and sum to 100%.
measuring training and on the main independent
variable capturing delegation.
Nearly all data, including the training mea-
sure, come from the “Management Question-
naire,” a face-to-face interview with the most
senior manager with responsibility for personnel
matters. We use, however, the linked “Employee
Questionnaire” for our preferred delegation mea-
sure as described below. The response rates for
2004 and 2011were 64% and 46% yielding 2,295
and 2,680 establishments, respectively. Response
rates are decreasing through time reflecting busi-
ness surveys trends (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013).14
After our restrictions, the sample sizes are 994 in
2004, 1,012 in 2011, and 474 in the panel.
Managers indicate the proportion of employ-
ees formally trained. The specific question asks:
(COFFJOB) “What proportion of experienced
employees in the largest non-managerial occu-
pational group have been given time off from
their normal daily work duties to undertake
training over the past 12 months.” The responses
include None (0%), Just a few (1%–19%),
Some (20%–39%), Around half (40%–59%),
Most (60%–79%), Almost all (80%–99%), and
All (100%). Table 1 provides the distribution
of responses showing that around 24% of the
establishments trained none of their employees
in 2004. This fell to 19% in 2011 and was 17%
in the panel. About 30% of the establishments
trained all employees in 2004. This increased to
35% in 2011 and was about 30% in the panel
14. The response rates of the employee questionnaire
for 2004 and 2011 were 60% and 54% yielding 22,451 and
21,981 employees, respectively.
sample.15 We exploit the categorical ranking by
using ordered probits for simple cross-sectional
analysis but we must use a linear count variable
(ordering the categories from 1 to 7) for the fixed
effect and IV estimates.
This training measure remains broad and
likely includes some training that is not related to
information acquisition. While recognizing this,
we emphasize that the notion of “investment”
from the theoretical model should not be taken
too narrowly. Some of the information acquisi-
tion resulting from training could include better
ways to organize the steps in production or how
to optimize break times. While not explicitly
investments in “plant and equipment” these
investments seem both a good fit with the theory
and likely to result from a large variety of types
of worker training. Also note that we will make
use of an alternative training measure and exper-
iment with creating a more pointed version of
our current measure without substantial changes
in the results.16
Our preferred delegation measure (we will
examine alternatives) comes from the employee
questionnaire. At each establishment up to
25 employees are randomly selected (every
15. There were 989 workplaces in WERS 2004 that also
participated in WERS 2011. The response rate of the panel
questionnaire was 52%.
16. The experiment noted that firms which provide infor-
mation to workers about potential investments engage in a full
category greater training on average. We then restricted our
delegation measure to apply only to those firms that provide
investment information (we assumed there was nomeaningful
delegation without such information). The estimations with
this narrower measure remain very similar and are available
upon request.
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TABLE 2
Distribution of Delegation
WERS 2004 WERS 2011 Panel 2004–2011
M SD Obs M SD Obs M SD Obs
None 0.114 0.318 114 0.051 0.221 54 0.054 0.226 41
A little 0.169 0.375 118 0.067 0.250 42 0.117 0.322 36
Some 0.417 0.493 461 0.396 0.489 417 0.437 0.496 229
A lot 0.300 0.459 301 0.485 0.500 499 0.392 0.488 168
Total observations 994 1,012 474
Notes: The delegation question is obtained from the employee questionnaire and reads as follows: “In general, how much
influence do you have about the range of tasks you do in your job?” Responses are recorded on a four-point scale: 1 “None,” 2 “A
little,” 3 “Some,” and 4 “A lot.” We aggregate the worker responses to the workplace level by taking the modal worker response,
ala De Varo and Kurtulus (2010). We code employee delegation to take the value of 1 if the modal response is “A lot” and 0 if
the modal response is “Some,” “A little,” and “None.” Means are weighted using workplace weights and sum to 100%.
employee is questioned at establishments with
less than 25) and asked: “In general, how much
influence do you have about the range of tasks
you do in your job?” Responses are recorded on
a 4-point scale: 1 “None,” 2 “A little,” 3 “Some,”
and 4 “A lot.” Following De Varo and Kurtulus
(2010), we identify delegation as present when
the modal response across an establishment’s
workers is “A lot” and absent when the modal
response is “Some,” “A little,” and “None.” Thus,
we take the most frequently occurring worker
response to reflect the degree of delegation in
that workplace.17
While this measure is subjective, it has been
shown to provide a reasonable proxy for delega-
tion toworkers (seeDeVaro andKurtulus 2010De
Varo and Prasad 2015). Yet, it differs in critical
ways from other measures of delegation. First, it
need not reflect the decision of actual firm own-
ers. Thus, the delegation we observe may be from
managers to workers, a point we return to in our
robustness exercises. Second, it differs frommea-
sures on whether decisions are made centrally
or at the plant level (Meagher and Wait 2014).
Despite these differences, it remains appropriate
for thinking about the provision of training.
Table 2 shows that the delegation responses
display significant variation across work-
places and over time. About one out of three
workplaces delegated in 2004 while 49%
17. We experimented with the mean and the median of
this measure and results remain robust. More fundamentally,
we also imagined retaining the mode but changing the cutoff
so that either reports of “A lot” or “Some” were identified as
delegation. We also imagined simply entering three dummies
for whether the mode was “A little,” “Some,” or “A lot.”
Neither of these reasonable alternatives to structuring the
critical independent variable change the fundamental results
we report and they are each available upon request.
delegated in 2011 and almost 40% delegated
in the panel.
In supporting information, we show that
delegation is most widespread in manufactur-
ing, utilities and construction where more than
three-quarters of the workplaces have employees
reporting “a lot” of delegation. The share is inter-
mediate in finance, health and education (around
half), and relatively small in transport and com-
munication, wholesale and retail trade. There is
no significant correlation with the extent of train-
ing by industry. Training is most widespread in
utilities, transport and communication, education
and health; intermediate in transport, construc-
tion and manufacturing and low in wholesale
and retail trade. The supporting information also
breaks the four incentive schemes by industry,
as well as offering a breakdown of the extent of
training, delegation, and incentive schemes by
firm size.
B. Empirical Methodology
We seek to determine whether or not dele-
gating to workers increases a firm’s incentive to
provide training. We acknowledge that not only
training but also many of the other variables
in the WERS are likely to be endogenous. As
made clear, our theoretical model takes delega-
tion as given and traces out the consequences.
Thus, our empirical strategy initially presents a
series of estimations that may be described as
descriptive although we feel we do a good job of
controlling for most of the relevant confounders.
Then, we move closer to testing for an exogenous
influence of delegation. This is done through IV
estimates and a series of robustness tests on those
IV estimates.
We initially estimate cross-sectional ordered
probits in which the categorical training measure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
BILANAKOS ET AL.: DELEGATION AND WORKER TRAINING 11
depends on delegation.18 Since our delegation
measure is built up from the employee question-
naire, we face a typical generated regressor prob-
lem (see, e.g., Murphy and Topel 1985; Pagan
1984). In response, we bootstrap the data using
1,000 replications with replacement and through-
out we report only bootstrapped standard errors.
We first present the ordered probit of train-
ing against the delegation measure and a lim-
ited set of controls. We recognize that fixed costs
in establishing training imply that larger orga-
nizations provide training more efficiently (Bar-
ron, Berger, and Black 1997; Black, Noel, and
Wang 1999; Booth 1991; Holtmann and Idson
1991). Moreover, such training programs may
take time to develop and may reflect the per-
manence and scope of the establishment. Thus,
we control for the (log) number of employees, if
the workplace has been operating for more than
5 years, whether the workplace is part of a larger
organization (i.e., multiworkplace) or is a single
independent workplace, and if the workplace is
UK owned/controlled.
In the second estimate, we capture workforce
characteristics known to influence training pro-
vision. These include the percentage of employ-
ees using computers, of female employees (Green
and Zanchi 1997), of part-time employees, and
of trade union members (Boheim and Booth
2004; Dustmann and Schönberg 2007; Green,
Machin, and Wilkinson 1999). Recognizing the
connection between the incentive to train and
the extent of labor mobility (Arulampalam and
Booth 1998), we also control for the percentages
of employees on fixed-term contract, of tempo-
rary agency employees, and of employees who
separate and quit in the previous year. We also
add controls for the educational attainment of
the workforce and the share of the workforce in
each of eight occupational groups and we include
seven dummies identifying the largest nonman-
agerial occupational group.
In a third estimate, we capture variation of
training across industries and regions by adding
ten industry dummies and nine region dummies.
The fourth estimate adds variables for perfor-
mance pay and market structure (Bilanakos et al.
2017) and represents our most complete specifi-
cation. There are four indicators of performance
pay (whether or not the nonmanagerial workers
receive payment by result, merit pay, profit-
related pay, or share ownership). The market
18. Appendix Table A1 reports the descriptive statistics
of all the variables used in the analysis.
structure variables are whether there are no,
few, or many competitors and whether the prod-
uct market is growing, mature, turbulent, or
declining.19
We recognize the possibility of unmeasured
establishment characteristics that influence both
the extent of training and delegation. Thus,
superior management may both train more and
delegate more. Failing to control for management
quality could bias the cross-section results. We
respond by estimating workplace fixed-effect
models. The resulting within-establishment vari-
ation eliminates the influence of unmeasured
time-invariant determinants of training allowing
a potentially superior estimate. As fixed-effect
ordered probits suffer from the incidental param-
eter problem associated with many nonlinear
estimates (see Greene 2001), we supplement
our analysis with OLS and Poisson fixed-effect
estimates that do not suffer from this problem
(Hilbe and Green 2008). The results across the
estimates remain very similar and continue to
show an important role for delegation.
We further recognize that fixed-effect esti-
mates need not eliminate the possibility of endo-
geneity. Thus, superior management may be new
to the establishment generating a spurious corre-
lation even in the fixed-effect estimates. More-
over, training may determine delegation. Thus,
it could be that only once an establishment has
trained its workforce will it have trust in its abil-
ity tomeaningfully delegate authority. To account
for such fears of endogeneity and reverse causa-
tion, we adopt an IV strategy based on industrial
aggregation (Fisman and Svensson 2007; Lai and
Ng 2014) that we describe in detail when pre-
senting the results.We implement this IV strategy
both for the cross-section and workplace fixed-
effect estimates in the panel.
Finally, we undertake a series of robustness
exercises designed to probe the stability and
reliability of the relationship. These involve
alternative variables for the key concepts, alter-
ing specifications, and estimating within critical
subsamples. The results appear remarkably
robust and at least point strongly toward an
exogenous influence of delegation.
19. While Bilanakos et al. (2017) present UK evidence
that dominant firms do more training, Meagher and Wait
(2014) present Australian evidence that delegation itself is
associated with more competitive product markets. Thus,
while initially controlling for these critical variables, we
ultimately tackle the implied concern with the endogeneity
of delegation.
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Ordered Probit Analysis
The first column of Table 3 presents the esti-
mate for 2004. The coefficient on employee del-
egation is positive and statistically significant fit-
ting the contention that delegation increases the
extent of training. It also shows the traditional
result that larger establishments provide more
training. Column 2 adds workforce characteris-
tics indicating that establishments provide more
training when their employees work with com-
puters, are female, unionized and employed full
time. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient
on delegation increases and becomes significant
at the 1% level. Column 3 shows that the mag-
nitude of the coefficient on delegation increases
again after allowing the extent of training to dif-
fer across industries, occupations, and regions.
Finally, column 4 shows that dominant firms train
more (see Bilanakos et al. 2017) as do firms that
provide profit-related pay. Worker mobility, how-
ever, is associated with less training. The coeffi-
cient on delegation retains size and significance.
There exists no indication that more complete
specifications reduce the role of delegation.
Column 5 provides estimates from an OLS
model that treats training as a cardinal count value
from 1 to 7. The coefficient indicates that delega-
tion is associated with an increase of 0.422 of a
training category. While we will shortly present
the full marginal effects from the ordered probit,
we report the OLS in order to make comparisons
with the other linear estimates that we report later.
In Table 4, we reproduce the series of esti-
mates for 2011. The pattern of the controls and
the size and significance of the delegation coeffi-
cient remain remarkably similar. Again, in col-
umn 5, we present an OLS estimate indicating
that delegation is associated with an increase of
0.488 of a training category.
In Table 5, we report the full marginal effects
of delegation from the final ordered probit esti-
mates. Column 1 indicates that in 2004 delega-
tion is associated with a decrease of 0.039 in
the probability of offering no training, and an
increase of 0.077 in the probability of training all
workers. Column 2 indicates that in 2011, del-
egation is associated with a decrease of 0.030
in the probability of offering no training and an
increase of 0.090 in the probability of offering
training to all workers. An increase of 0.090 rep-
resents a 26% increase on the mean probability
of 0.349. The marginal effects are broadly sim-
ilar across the two surveys and suggest that the
magnitudes of the statistical relationship are eco-
nomically consequential. Workplaces that dele-
gate offer more training, a relationship that we
now probe more deeply.
B. Panel Estimates
Despite the fact that our measure of delega-
tion comes from the employee questionnaire, an
innovation in the WERS allows us to retain our
delegation measure in the workplace panel. Prior
to the most recent two waves (2011 and 2004),
the WERS panel was a separate set of establish-
ments that could not be taken back to the linked
employee data available in the cross sections. For
the first time, the panel is now part of the cross
sections and so linked to the employee data for
2011 and 2004. Incorporating workplace fixed
effects removes time-invariant unobserved het-
erogeneity such as some workplaces having rou-
tinely superior management. Thus, it presents a
relevant robustness exercise.
Column 1 of Table 6 presents a pooled ordered
probit estimate without fixed effects on the panel
of workplaces. The delegation coefficient is very
close in size to those from the cross sections sug-
gesting that the panel is not a highly selected sam-
ple. Column 2 presents the OLS estimate which
treats the ordered categories of training as car-
dinal and indicates that delegation is associated
with 0.379 of a category more training.20
Column 3 shows that the OLS fixed-effect
coefficient remains highly significant and mod-
estly larger in magnitude than in the pooled OLS.
Thus, there appears no evidence that unmeasured
time-invariant characteristics generate a down-
ward bias. The column 3 estimates indicate that
firms which delegate increase their training by
0.389 of a category.
As a robustness check, we estimate alterna-
tive functional forms for the fixed-effects esti-
mate. The dependent variable may be better
considered a count variable allowing estima-
tion of the fixed-effect Poisson regression. This
is one of the few nonlinear fixed-effect esti-
mators without incidental parameters concerns
(Hilbe and Green 2008). The results are pre-
sented in column 4 and show that the estimated
coefficient retains an economically significant
20. All fixed-effects specifications in our analysis include
industry controls. Even though reported industry switches
from 2004 to 2011 are rare, they do happen, so the models are
estimated with the industry controls. If the industry controls
are dropped from our analysis, the results remain essentially
unchanged.
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TABLE 3
Dependent Variable: Categorical Measure of Share Trained (WERS 2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
(5)
OLS
Delegation 0.184** 0.213*** 0.242*** 0.236*** 0.422***
(0.073) (0.079) (0.081) (0.082) (0.142)
Log number of employees 0.079*** 0.071** 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.153***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.052)
Workplace operates more than 5 years −0.119 −0.182 −0.188 −0.160 −0.208
(0.130) (0.144) (0.147) (0.150) (0.259)
Part of a larger organization 0.328* 0.311 0.221 0.192 0.398
(0.180) (0.190) (0.208) (0.219) (0.393)
Single independent workplace 0.041 0.148 0.100 0.069 0.252
(0.191) (0.202) (0.221) (0.233) (0.410)
UK owned −0.109 −0.180* −0.232** −0.236** −0.433**
(0.088) (0.103) (0.108) (0.108) (0.192)
% of employees using computers 0.389*** 0.420*** 0.360** 0.651***
(0.140) (0.141) (0.146) (0.242)
% of female employees 0.747*** 0.824*** 0.808*** 1.439***
(0.206) (0.239) (0.243) (0.406)
% of part-time employees −0.754*** −0.818*** −0.847*** −1.281***
(0.210) (0.223) (0.230) (0.368)
% union membership 0.432*** 0.389** 0.444** 0.729**
(0.158) (0.171) (0.179) (0.306)
% of employees with a fixed-term contract 0.341* 0.401* 0.379* 0.673*
(0.205) (0.221) (0.225) (0.395)
% of employees with a temporary contract −0.155 −0.212 −0.342 −0.469
(0.461) (0.491) (0.503) (0.792)
% of employees who quit last year −0.153 −0.207 −0.264 −0.345
(0.252) (0.255) (0.262) (0.438)
% of employees dismissed/redundant last year −0.700 −0.570 −0.818* −1.792**
(0.430) (0.457) (0.458) (0.806)
Payment by result 0.012 0.081
(0.095) (0.166)
Merit pay 0.010 0.065
(0.113) (0.205)
Profit-related pay 0.218** 0.400***
(0.088) (0.153)
Employee share schemes 0.119 0.201
(0.106) (0.188)
Few competitors −0.285* −0.292*
(0.147) (0.165)
Many competitors −0.342** −0.357**
(0.144) (0.163)
Market growing 0.175* 0.339*
(0.106) (0.185)
Market mature 0.031 0.058
(0.118) (0.208)
Market declining −0.238 −0.350
(0.160) (0.274)
Cutoff 1 −0.697*** −0.065 −0.331 −0.287
(0.228) (0.371) (0.432) (0.488)
Cutoff 2 −0.101 0.596 0.346 0.399
(0.228) (0.372) (0.432) (0.488)
Cutoff 3 0.255 0.993*** 0.752* 0.812*
(0.228) (0.373) (0.431) (0.488)
Cutoff 4 0.526** 1.298*** 1.064** 1.128**
(0.229) (0.374) (0.433) (0.489)
Cutoff 5 0.723*** 1.518*** 1.287*** 1.354***
(0.229) (0.374) (0.432) (0.488)
Cutoff 6 1.044*** 1.867*** 1.642*** 1.712***
(0.230) (0.375) (0.434) (0.490)
Constant 1.079
(0.841)
Observations 994 994 994 994 994
R2 0.248
Educational composition No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational composition No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Largest Occupational groups No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Missing dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors using 1,000 replications with replacement are clustered at workplace cells and reported in parentheses.
Estimates use workplace weights.
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1.
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TABLE 4
Dependent Variable: Categorical Measure of Share Trained (WERS 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
(5)
OLS
Delegation 0.236*** 0.229*** 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.488***
(0.070) (0.073) (0.075) (0.077) (0.135)
Log number of employees 0.070*** 0.063** 0.076** 0.069** 0.141**
(0.021) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.059)
Workplace operates more than 5 years −0.014 −0.045 −0.045 −0.045 −0.179
(0.151) (0.157) (0.163) (0.166) (0.278)
Part of a larger organization 0.258 0.205 0.221 0.207 0.471
(0.204) (0.204) (0.212) (0.214) (0.395)
Single independent workplace −0.085 −0.077 −0.063 −0.056 0.104
(0.217) (0.220) (0.228) (0.232) (0.425)
UK owned −0.097 −0.189* −0.195* −0.210* −0.460**
(0.096) (0.112) (0.114) (0.117) (0.209)
% of employees using computers 0.445*** 0.464*** 0.430*** 0.857***
(0.145) (0.149) (0.152) (0.255)
% of female employees 0.568*** 0.443** 0.453** 0.824**
(0.201) (0.220) (0.224) (0.398)
% of part-time employees −0.432** −0.524*** −0.532*** −1.206***
(0.182) (0.194) (0.194) (0.329)
% union membership 0.783*** 0.848*** 0.860*** 1.590***
(0.183) (0.206) (0.214) (0.359)
% of employees with a fixed-term contract 0.741*** 0.737*** 0.747*** 1.226***
(0.208) (0.211) (0.212) (0.305)
% of employees with a temporary contract 0.227 0.161 0.122 0.032
(0.413) (0.452) (0.466) (0.773)
% of employees who quit last year −0.632* −0.463 −0.473 −0.941
(0.357) (0.369) (0.375) (0.617)
% of employees dismissed/redundant last year −0.526 −0.520 −0.680* −0.695*
(0.340) (0.374) (0.390) (0.412)
Payment by result 0.021 0.124
(0.101) (0.181)
Merit pay 0.099 0.169
(0.106) (0.184)
Profit-related pay 0.175** 0.336**
(0.087) (0.151)
Employee share schemes 0.072 0.095
(0.129) (0.233)
Few competitors −0.428** −0.498**
(0.213) (0.250)
Many competitors −0.439** −0.502**
(0.214) (0.247)
Market growing 0.195** 0.338**
(0.098) (0.166)
Market mature 0.196* 0.337*
(0.113) (0.195)
Market declining −0.148 −0.281
(0.129) (0.226)
Cutoff 1 −0.894*** 0.223 0.450 0.692
(0.264) (0.474) (0.532) (0.567)
Cutoff 2 −0.351 0.825* 1.063** 1.312**
(0.265) (0.475) (0.531) (0.566)
Cutoff 3 0.043 1.274*** 1.518*** 1.772***
(0.264) (0.475) (0.530) (0.566)
Cutoff 4 0.269 1.529*** 1.778*** 2.032***
(0.263) (0.476) (0.530) (0.565)
Cutoff 5 0.482* 1.763*** 2.017*** 2.271***
(0.262) (0.475) (0.530) (0.565)
Cutoff 6 0.832*** 2.142*** 2.402*** 2.657***
(0.261) (0.476) (0.531) (0.567)
Constant −0.195
(0.994)
Observations 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
R2 0.240
Educational characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational composition No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Largest occupational group dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Missing dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors using 1,000 replications with replacement are clustered at workplace cells and reported in parentheses.
Estimates use workplace weights.
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1.
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TABLE 5
Marginal Effects
WERS 2004 WERS 2011
(1) (2)
Delegation Delegation
Training ME SE ME SE
Cutoff 1: none −0.039*** 0.012 −0.030*** 0.010
Cutoff 2: just a few −0.037*** 0.013 −0.034*** 0.011
Cutoff 3: some −0.016*** 0.006 −0.024*** 0.008
Cutoff 4: around half −0.003 0.002 −0.008*** 0.003
Cutoff 5: most 0.004** 0.002 0.002* 0.001
Cutoff 6: almost all 0.014*** 0.005 0.008*** 0.002
Cutoff 7: all 0.077*** 0.027 0.090*** 0.028
Notes: Entries are marginal effects obtained from a weighted
ordered probit model based on the estimates reported in column 4 of
Table 3 (WERS 2004) and in column 4 of Table 4 (WERS 2011),
respectively. We only report the marginal effects of the variable of
interest. Marginal effects for all the other covariates are available
upon request. Robust standard errors are obtained using a bootstrap
exercise with 1,000 replications with replacement and are clustered at
workplace cells.
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1.
magnitude and statistical significance. We also
estimate conditional fixed-effect logits (which
eliminate the incidental parameter problem) by
dividing the categories of training into high and
low, as well as fixed-effect ordered probits (avail-
able as a canned routine in LIMDEP) that retain
the incidental parameter problem. We present the
results in the online Appendix Table S1, Sup-
porting Information, to this paper and confirm
the pattern of estimates shown in Table 6. The
estimates are remarkably similar across establish-
ments and within establishments, thus when an
establishment moves to delegate it provides more
training.21
C. Endogeneity and IV Estimates
While the fixed-effect estimates are reassur-
ing, we recognize that the positive correlation
between delegation and training could still
21. We also searched for a proxy to the theoretical prod-
uct market uncertainty, E. The WERS question closest asks
if the product market is “growing,” “mature,” “declining” or
“turbulent.” If we identify uncertain environments as “tur-
bulent,” then this variable and its interaction with delega-
tion take insignificant coefficients. If we identify uncertain
environments as both turbulent and declining markets, then
the interaction takes a negative and significant coefficient
that essentially eliminates the influence of delegation. These
results are available upon request. Thus, if one thought high
E was associated with turbulent or declining product markets,
the suggestion that delegation has no influence might be seen
as broadly fitting with the theory. Yet, we emphasize that the
available question is not a particularly good theoretical fit.
Lo et al. (2016) proxy environmental uncertainty using two
measures, rapid technological change, and industry demand
uncertainty. They find that both measures of environmental
uncertainty have a negative but not always statistically signif-
icant effect on price delegation.
emerge endogenously. As an illustration, supe-
rior management could arrive between the two
observations. Here, a critical determinant is not
time invariant. More dramatically, the causation
could be reversed. A more trained workforce
reassures the firm that employees are sufficiently
equipped to have more influence.
To examine these possibilities, we undertake
an IV strategy based on industrial aggregation
(examples include Fisman and Svensson 2007
and Lai and Ng 2014). The strategy posits that
unmeasured characteristics of an industry help
to define the extent of delegation by workplaces
within that industry. In our case, these industry
characteristics stand as exogenous influences
that make it more or less likely that firms within
the industry will delegate. They may reflect
the nature of the product and the underlying
technology. The empirical implementation gen-
erates an identifying variable that aggregates
the delegation indicator. This aggregate varies
by workplace within the industry by excluding
the workplace for which it is computed. Thus,
the identifying variable is the proportion of
workplaces in industry cells reporting “A lot” of
delegation after removing the given workplace
from the industry cell.
Table 7 provides estimates from the panel
and again contrasts an estimate that does not
hold constant workplace fixed effects (columns
1 and 2) with one that does hold them constant
(columns 3 and 4). Using two-stage least squares
(2SLS), linear probability models are estimated
in the first stages for the endogenous delegation
indicators with the cardinal value of the training
variable as the ultimate second stage-dependent
variable. The second stage returns the estimated
values from the first stage along with the joint
variables to estimates on training. The first stage
routinely shows a strong positive correlation
between the industry average and the excluded
establishment value. There is no evidence of a
weak instrument and the other diagnostics are
also supportive. The second-stage panel estimate
of delegation is very close to the magnitudes
for the two cross sections, again showing that
the panel data is not a highly selected sample.22
Here, the standard errors are clustered at the
workplace level.
Columns 3–4 combine the IV strategy with
a workplace fixed-effect estimate. We alter the
procedure slightly from the pooled estimates by
22. These IV estimates on the cross section are available
as Table S2 in the online appendix.
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TABLE 6
Panel Data 2004–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ordered Probit
without FE
OLS
without FE
OLS
with FE
Poisson
with FE
Delegation 0.214** (0.092) 0.379** (0.164) 0.389** (0.192) 0.246** (0.121)
Log-likelihood −658.424 −170.542
R2 0.341 0.895
Observations 474 474 474 474
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes No No
Workplace characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workforce characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational composition Yes Yes Yes Yes
Largest occupational group dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
PRP dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Competition dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Missing dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: For information on the sample and on the main variables of interest, see Notes in Tables 1 and 2. The dependent
variable is the proportion of experienced employees in the largest occupational group who have been given time off from their
normal daily work to undertake training over the last 12months. For reasons of brevity, we only present estimates of the main
independent variable of interest. Other controls are those shown in column 4 of Table 3, as well as a year dummy. The estimates
for the rest of the covariates are available upon request. Bootstrap standard errors using 1,000 replications with replacement and
clustered at workplace cells are reported in parentheses. Estimates are weighted using workplace weights.
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1.Q6
now clustering errors at the industry level as each
pair of workplace observations now contribute at
most once to the workplace fixed-effect estimate.
Column 3 presents the first stage results. Esti-
mates suggest that establishments that are part
of a larger organization, offer payment by result,
and operate in growing markets are more likely
to delegate. The latter two results are in line with
Lo et al. (2016) who find that price delegation
is higher when firms offer pay for performance
and when there is less market uncertainty. Col-
umn 4 presents the second stage results. This
second-stage IV estimate with workplace fixed
effects is modestly larger. The results indicate an
increase of 0.538 of a category. This is noticeably
larger than the comparable fixed-effect estimate
of 0.389 of a category without the IV (see col-
umn 3 of Table 6). As the bands of training are
roughly 20 percentage points each, moving 0.538
of a band is roughly equivalent to training an
additional 11% of the establishment’s workforce.
The diagnostics continue to be supportive.23
23. While not formal tests, two results support our strat-
egy. First, if delegation is predicted using training in a work-
place fixed-effect estimate, it is simply irrelevant hinting that
reverse causation may not be an issue. Second, when the
assumed exogenous industrial aggregation is added to a single
stage workplace fixed-effect estimate of training, it emerges
with a very small and insignificant coefficient, less than 0.01
(t-stat of 0.60), even as the coefficient on delegation remains
large and highly significant. This suggests we have introduced
meaningful exogenous variation.
These estimates suggest that plausibly inde-
pendent movements of delegation are associated
with the extent of training. The fact that the IV
estimate tends to be larger may reflect that instru-
menting has reduced measurement error and the
associated attenuation bias. Alternatively, it may
reflect a truly larger local treatment effect. The
critical point remains that there exists no evi-
dence that failure to instrument generates an
upward bias. When the IV is combined with
the fixed-effect estimates, they add confidence to
our results and seem sensible. Moreover, these
estimates come closer to testing our theoreti-
cal notion that exogenous changes in delegation
increase training.
Yet, we recognize that our IV does not guar-
antee unbiasedness when some other potentially
endogenous variables remain uninstrumented. So
we ran a variation that limited the included con-
trols to only the region and industry dummies.
These specifications look broadly similar with no
indication of a weak instrument, and an IV indi-
cating that delegation is associated with a signifi-
cant increase of 0.388 of a training category (see
online appendix Table S3).
We undertook a series of additional variations
in our IV strategy. With better data we could gen-
erate a lagged IV that would eliminate the data
of the specific firm being considered and also use
data from an earlier wave. Such lagging can help
generate IVs that are less likely to be endogenous.
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TABLE 7
Instrumental Variable (IV) Results, Panel 2004–2011
Without Workplace Fixed Effects With Workplace Fixed Effects
First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Delegation Training Delegation Training
Delegation 0.504** (0.243) 0.538*** (0.169)
Instrument for delegation 0.068*** (0.004) 0.092*** (0.006)
Log number of employees 0.014 (0.015) 0.105* (0.056) 0.052 (0.092) 0.032 (0.095)
Workplace operates more than 5 years 0.067 (0.100) 0.009 (0.198) 0.028 (0.198) −0.102 (0.270)
Part of a larger organization 0.095** (0.045) 0.122 (0.286) 0.170* (0.095) 0.319 (0.378)
Single independent establishment 0.082* (0.047) 0.078 (0.256) 0.078 (0.062) 0.454 (0.372)
UK owned 0.037 (0.043) −0.099 (0.114) 0.092 (0.158) −0.458** (0.237)
% of employees using computers 0.057** (0.035) 0.223* (0.125) 0.020 (0.012) 0.152 (0.186)
% of female employees −0.027 (0.062) 0.380* (0.214) −0.011 (0.067) 0.855** (0.401)
% of part-time employees −0.067 (0.092) −0.396** (0.172) −0.156 (0.225) −0.775* (0.435)
% union membership 0.040 (0.101) 0.142* (0.078) 0.160 (0.324) 0.542* (0.314)
% of employees with a fixed-term contract 0.158 (0.105) 0.028 (0.159) 0.224 (0.229) 0.168 (0.294)
% of employees with a temporary contract −0.143 (0.270) −0.659 (0.473) −0.036 (0.572) −0.865* (0.479)
% of employees who quit last year −0.110 (0.123) −0.084 (0.241) −0.270 (0.320) −0.095 (0.370)
% of employees dismissed/redundant last year −0.205 (0.115) −0.464** (0.231) −0.038 (0.321) −0.262* (0.142)
Payment by result 0.042* (0.024) 0.015 (0.095) 0.132* (0.069) 0.020 (0.110)
Merit pay 0.041 (0.052) 0.196** (0.100) 0.020 (0.128) 0.275** (0.137)
Profit-related pay 0.027 (0.040) 0.172** (0.080) 0.085 (0.089) 0.070 (0.094)
Employee share schemes 0.037 (0.058) −0.075 (0.117) 0.019 (0.085) 0.205 (0.179)
Few competitors 0.110 (0.088) −0.129** (0.065) 0.030 (0.110) −0.330* (0.172)
Many competitors 0.167* (0.095) −0.187*** (0.071) 0.140 (0.189) −0.430* (0.240)
Market growing 0.045** (0.022) 0.207** (0.096) 0.075* (0.042) 0.072* (0.037)
Market mature 0.012 (0.055) 0.050 (0.094) 0.052 (0.126) 0.026 (0.130)
Market declining −0.080 (0.056) −0.197 (0.214) −0.080 (0.149) −0.152 (0.189)
F-statistic (H0: instrument is weak) 250.90 p val.= .000 175.69 p val.= .000
Observations 474 474
Educational composition Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational composition Yes Yes Yes Yes
Largest group occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes No No
Missing dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The instrument for delegation is the proportion of workplaces in industry cells reporting a “lot of” delegation after
removing the given workplace from the industry cell. The estimation method is a 2SLS. Bootstrap standard errors using 1,000
replications with replacement and clustered at workplace cells (columns 1 and 2) and at industry cells (columns 3 and 4) are
reported in parentheses. Estimates are weighted using workplace weights. Estimates for the other control variables are available
upon request.
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1.
Unfortunately, we can trace firms for only two
waves (2004 and 2011) so we cannot fully lag
our current IV. We did estimate the 2011 training
estimates using the 2004 instrument for delega-
tion. We use the panel data from 2004 to generate
industry averages that exclude the specific firm.
This is used as an exogenous variable to generate
the 2011 establishment-specific IV. This is pre-
sented in the first two columns of Table 8 and
looks broadly similar both to the cross-sectional
IV estimates in the online appendix and to the
results in Table 7 suggesting that delegation is
associated with 0.728 of a category increase in
training. Note that by using the panel, we elimi-
nate concerns that firms observed in 2011 might
have entered in response to 2004 conditions. The
identifying assumption is that past decisions by
firms in this industry are exogenous to today’s
delegation decision by the firm in question, even
though the firm in question was present in the
industry in the past.
We varied this strategy by using the larger
cross sections in 2004 and 2011 (which are not
linked). We use the earlier cross section to aggre-
gate industry averages that we use as excluded
variables to generate a new 2011 IV. There is
no individual establishment variation in these
averages as the firms are not linked (the varia-
tion is by industry). We limit attention to only
those 2011 establishments more than 7 years old.
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TABLE 8
Robustness Tests using Lagged Instrumental Variables
WERS—Panel 2011 WERS—Cross Section 2011 WERS—Panel 2004–2011
First stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delegation Training Delegation Training Delegation Training
Delegation 0.728**
(0.344)
0.452*
(0.251)
0.559***
(0.178)
Instrument for delegation 1.029***
(0.046)
0.010**
(0.004)
0.036***
(0.009)
Workplace fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
F-statistic (H0:
instrument is weak)
501.09
p val.= .000
12.27
p val.= .012
14.29
p val.= .000
Observations 202 853 462
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workforce characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Largest occupational
group dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incentive pay controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Competition controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current market state
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Missing dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Industry dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: The instrument in column 1 is lagged industry-level delegation constructed using 2004 observations only from the
panel sample. We estimate this specification only for the 2011 panel data. In column 3, the instrument is lagged industry-level
delegation constructed using the 2004 cross section for those firms that have been in operation for more than 7 years. In column
5, the instrument is composed of lagged 1998 industry-level delegation for 2004 observations, and lagged 2004 industry-level
delegation for 2011 observations. The estimation method is a 2SLS. Bootstrapped standard errors using 1,000 replications with
replacement are clustered at the workplace cells (columns 1–4) and at industry cells (columns 5 and 6) and are reported in
parentheses. Estimates are weighted using workplace weights. Estimates for the other control variables are available upon
request. In columns 5 and 6, we also add a year dummy. The number of observations for all three IV robustness checks is
smaller compared to those where the instrument is contemporaneous as we lose observations when merging in lagged
industry-level delegation.
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1.
This eliminates firms that may have entered the
industry in response to critical endogenous vari-
ables. The familiar result of delegation being
associated with about a half a training category
increase emerges and remains weakly significant
in otherwise supportive IV estimates as shown in
column 4 of Table 8.
As the estimates above cannot allow us to
include establishment fixed effects, we modify
our lagged IV to test a third alternative. We use
the 1998 cross section of the WERS. We cannot
follow individual firms from the 2004 and 2011
panel back to 1998 and so cannot link firm-level
delegation between 2004 and 1998. As an alter-
native, we simply use the industrial aggregation
across the 1998 cross section to predict individ-
ual establishment delegation in the 2004 panel.
We match this by using the industrial aggregation
across the 2004 cross section to predict individ-
ual establishment delegation in the 2011 panel.
The results are shown in column 6 of Table 8 and
also remain broadly similar to those in Table 7.
While we still cannot exclude the specific estab-
lishment from the aggregation (and so generate
within industry variation in the excluded vari-
able), we can both use a lagged measure and esti-
mate the fixed effect on the panel.
Thus, all three of these variations in the IV
strategy remain supportive. While one might
think of other variations, these give no indication
that the simultaneity in our initial IV spuriously
generates our results.
D. Additional Robustness Tests and Discussion
We now undertake a series of robustness tests
that bolster the empirical results. First, we iden-
tify alternative potential measures of delegation.
These come from theManagement Questionnaire
and so provide an alternative view to that built up
from the actual workers. The first asks managers:
“To what extent would you say that the largest
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occupational group here have discretion over how
they do their work?” “A lot,” “Some,” “Little,”
“None.” We identify delegation as if the manager
replies “A lot.” This response is limited to the
largest occupational group but we use it as the
critical measure in estimates that mimic the fixed-
effect IV estimate in Table 7 (columns 3 and 4).24
The IV continues to perform well and suggests
that delegation using this measure is associated
with a significant 0.545 of a category increase
in training.
A second alternative asks managers: “To what
extent would you say that the largest occupational
group have involvement in decisions over how
their work is organised?” “A lot,” “Some,” “Lit-
tle,” “None.” Again, we identify delegation as
when the manager replies “A lot.” This is also
limited to the largest occupational group and now
emphasizes the role in decision-making of work-
ers over their own work. While it may be only
an aspect of delegation, it continues to show an
association with training. In the fixed-effect IV
estimates, it is associated with a significant 0.376
of a category increase in training. We have com-
bined this measure with the previous one using
principal components and used the resulting vari-
able as a delegation measure.25 It again takes a
meaningfully large coefficient in the fixed-effect
IV estimates. All three of these estimates are pre-
sented in Appendix Table A2.
As a related robustness test, we return to the
dependent variable on training and augment it
with a follow-up question in the WERS. Those
establishments which provide training to their
workforce are asked the typical number of train-
ing days provided in the last year. The responses
are listed in one of six categories with all those
that provide no training placed in the lowest cat-
egory: “No time” (1), “Less than 1 day” (2), “1
to less than 2 days” (3), “2 to less than 5 days”
(4), “5 to less than 10 days” (5), and “10 days
or more” (6). This provides a measure of train-
ing intensity different from the share of work-
ers being trained. We repeat the series of estima-
tions using this alternative measure and present
24. Pooled ordered probit and OLS panel estimates with-
out workplace fixed effects that mimic columns 1 and 2 of
Table 6 are reported in Table S4 in the online appendix.
25. The eigenvalue of 1.4 between discretion and involve-
ment exceeds the rule of thumb of 1.0. Moreover, the first
principal component explains over 70% of the common vari-
ance of the two measures. In addition to principal component
analysis, we also created an aggregate standardized measure
of delegation by creating and adding together the associated
Z-scores. The results remain robust and are available upon
request.
the results with the panel IV estimates with and
without workplace fixed effects in Table 9.26
The first stages continue to suggest the
absence of weak instruments and the addition
of the fixed-effect estimation suggests only a
modestly increase in the coefficient of interest.
The final column in Table 9 suggests that del-
egation is associated with an increase of 0.529
of a category in the days of training measure.
Combining this with the earlier estimates sug-
gests that workplaces which delegate both train
a larger share of their workers and provide more
training time.
We now return to the potential role of incen-
tive schemes. Workplace incentives vary dramat-
ically in terms of whom they target, what they
reward, and how large a share of compensation
they represent. The WERS provides information
on whether the establishment makes use of four
types of performance pay: payment by result,
merit pay, profit-related pay, and employee share
ownership schemes. The objective of each may
well differ but it seems likely that payment by
result and merit pay tie individual effort and deci-
sions to compensation in a very immediate way
and so are designed to align the interests of work-
ers with the firm as suggested in Appendix A.
Thus, they potentially inform our earlier review
of the literature, theory, and testing. If they suc-
ceed in such alignment, the investment in training
can be anticipated to be greater once delegation
has taken place.
We recognize that incentive schemes are likely
to be highly endogenous as is delegation so we
are limited in what we can credibly test. We
present largely as descriptive a simple division of
the sample into those firms that make use of either
(or both) of the two individual incentive schemes
and those that do not. We reproduce our initial
fixed-effect IV estimates separately for these two
groups of firms in Table 10.
The “high incentives” group of establishments
that use the individual-level schemes presents the
typical results. The IV strategy remains sensi-
ble (no weak instruments) and the results fit the
intuition we have developed. Delegation contin-
ues to play an independent role and is associated
with a significant increase of 0.524 of a train-
ing category. While the IV strategy still seems
workable in the “low incentives” establishments
(those that do not use the individual incentives)
26. Cross section and panel estimates of this exercise
without instrumenting are available in Table S5 of the online
appendix.
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TABLE 9
Alternative Dependent Variable (Days of Training), Instrumental Variable Results, Panel 2004–2011
Without Workplace Fixed Effects With Workplace Fixed Effects
First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Delegation Training Delegation Training
Delegation 0.520** (0.261) 0.529** (0.267)
Instrument for delegation 0.030*** (0.003) 0.045*** (0.004)
Log number of employees 0.025 (0.021) 0.281*** (0.062) 0.012 (0.080) 0.568* (0.337)
Workplace operates more than 5 years 0.247** (0.120) 0.122 (0.360) 0.090 (0.270) −0.795 (0.600)
Part of a larger organization 0.203 (0.240) 0.385 (0.368) 0.071 (0.190) 0.555 (0.564)
Single independent establishment 0.113 (0.242) 0.566 (0.369) 0.036 (0.172) 0.589 (0.670)
UK owned 0.008 (0.080) 0.099 (0.210) 0.360 (0.320) −0.346 (0.305)
% of employees using computers 0.045 (0.100) 0.459* (0.268) 0.062 (0.110) 0.450 (0.340)
% of female employees −0.369** (0.167) 0.521* (0.292) −0.450* (0.249) 0.859* (0.508)
% of part-time employees −0.085 (0.144) −0.890** (0.359) −0.170 (0.192) −0.750 (0.439)
% union membership 0.057 (0.139) 0.253 (0.362) −0.380 (0.340) 0.690* (0.350)
% of employees with a fixed-term contract 0.202 (0.161) 0.403 (0.499) 0.120 (0.168) 0.070 (0.629)
% of employees with a temporary contract −0.196 (0.451) −0.041 (0.341) −0.430 (0.670) −0.936 (0.780)
% of employees who quit last year −0.030 (0.186) −0.403 (0.499) −0.055 (0.279) −0.010 (0.205)
% of employees dismissed/redundant last year −0.306 (0.247) −0.239 (0.749) −0.304 (0.545) −0.522** (0.258)
Payment by result 0.044* (0.026) 0.087 (0.187) 0.080 (0.109) 0.150 (0.149)
Merit pay 0.011 (0.067) 0.351 (0.182) 0.095 (0.089) 0.210 (0.260)
Profit-related pay 0.009 (0.062) 0.089 (0.178) 0.039 (0.072) 0.470 (0.160)
Employee share schemes 0.158 (0.189) 0.012 (0.243) 0.101 (0.134) 0.190 (0.135)
Few competitors 0.105 (0.134) −0.105** (0.045) 0.240 (0.230) −0.420* (0.248)
Many competitors 0.108 (0.135) −0.175** (0.078) 0.254 (0.232) −0.460* (0.259)
Market growing 0.011 (0.067) 0.244* (0.142) 0.049 (0.201) 0.310 (0.410)
Market mature 0.027 (0.074) 0.002 (0.220) 0.025 (0.242) 0.264 (0.289)
Market declining 0.084 (0.082) 0.028 (0.238) 0.015 (0.130) −0.039 (0.602)
F-statistic (H0: instrument is weak) 145.46 p val.= .000 127.42 p val.= .000
Observations 474 474
Educational composition Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational composition Yes Yes Yes Yes
Largest group occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes No No
Missing dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The instrument for delegation is the proportion of workplaces in industry cells reporting a “lot of” delegation after
removing the given workplace from the industry cell. The estimation method is a 2SLS. Bootstrap standard errors using 1,000
replications with replacement and clustered at workplace cells (columns 1 and 2) and at industry cells (columns 3 and 4) are
reported in parentheses. Estimates for the other control variables are available upon request.
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1.
the coefficient is insignificant. Yet, this does not
seem to be because of a large diminution in coeffi-
cient size. The point estimate admittedly drops to
0.421 but it is imprecision that seemingly causes
this lack of statistical significance. In any event,
it seems appropriate given our earlier descrip-
tion that the result should be stronger among
those establishments using higher powered indi-
vidual incentives.
As a final robustness check, we recognize
that in some establishments owner-managers
make training and delegation decisions while
in other establishments, hired-managers make
these decisions. While we have assumed that
hired-managers act in the owner’s interest,
this may not be the case. To examine the
empirical pattern, we divide our sample by a
question that asks: “Are the controlling owners
actively involved in day-to-day management
of this workplace on a full-time basis?” The
responses identify slightly more than one-fifth
of the sample with an owner-manager and the
remainder with a hired-manager. We repeat the
IV exercise on the divided sample and using
our original, preferred measures of training
and delegation. The results for owner-manager
establishments reported in columns 5 and 6
in Table 10 reveal a very large and significant
role for delegation. Indeed, the implied increase
of virtually a full training category stands as
the largest magnitude of any of our estimates.
We see this as the tight fit with our theoretical
model as the delegation decision involves the
owner.
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The results for the hired-manager establish-
ments reported in columns 7 and 8 in Table 10
reveal a smaller but still positive and signif-
icant influence for delegation. The implied
increase remains about one-half of a training
category. This attenuation in magnitude may
flow from agency problems between owners and
hired-managers but a full modeling of such a
three-tier hierarchy is beyond the scope of this
paper. We, nonetheless, find it reassuring that
the relationship remains intact as it suggests that
hired-managers broadly follow the pattern of
owner-managers.
These robustness exercises, together with the
original results, inform the theoretical issue we
initially isolated. If the firm delegates, then it
suffers a loss of control but at the same time
gives workers stronger effort incentives. If train-
ing reduces the marginal cost of effort, then the
resulting increase in effort can justify the cost
of additional training. Thus, one might antici-
pate that delegation generates greater employer-
provided training, a result routinely returned in
our empirical investigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we uniquely provide a the-
oretical illustration and supporting empirical
evidence showing that delegation increases
employee training. We impose delegation or
integration exogenously in our model. This can
be sensible for some cases (new outside manage-
ment) and as a reflection of structural differences
between industries (which we exploit in our IV
estimation). Yet, it will not apply to all cases.
Within this framework, our nonequilibrium
approach of looking at integrating and delegating
firms separately provides a sensible and testable
association between delegation and training. We
recognize, however, that it may not help inform
those interested in the exact pathways that result
in the endogenous choice of delegation as part of
simultaneous bundle of management practices.
We assume that employer-provided training
reduces the agent’smarginal effort cost of becom-
ing informed about the payoffs of alternative
investment projects. We show that delegation of
decision-making authority increases training if
the preferences of the firm and the worker are
sufficiently congruent. When this holds, the pos-
itive effect of delegation on the worker’s effort
incentives dominates the loss-of-control effect
and therefore the firm becomes willing to provide
additional training.
We test the hypothesis of a positive relation-
ship between delegation and training on two
cross sections and an associated panel of British
establishments. Our preferred measure of del-
egation is built up from workers within each
establishment and time period. It identifies del-
egation when the modal response of the work-
ers is that they have a lot of influence over their
tasks. Indeed, we confirm that those establish-
ments which delegate also provide training to a
larger share of their workers. This remains true in
increasingly more complete specifications, when
accounting for establishment fixed effects, using
alternative functional forms and in a plausible
IV exercise that also controls for establishment
fixed effects. The result also proves robust when
altering the dependent variable to capture train-
ing intensity in number of days, and to alter-
native measures of delegation coming from the
management questionnaire.
This result argues that those workplaces where
there may be particularly good information at the
level of the worker will want to delegate but that
they will also want to engage in more training
than those firms which do not delegate. Future
“insider” econometrics might provide important
insights that support or refute this argument. It
would be wonderful to identify a specific estab-
lishment that devolves to workers tasks or choices
previously undertaken by the management. Our
survey evidence would suggest that such devolu-
tion would be accompanied by increased worker
training so that superior choices would be made.
Also developing insights with survey data from
other countries concerning delegation and train-
ing seems a sensible next step. Furthermore, the
positive interaction between incentive pay and
delegation revealed by our evidence might be
informing a more sophisticated theoretical model
in which congruence could be affected by appro-
priately designed incentive schemes. The full
exploration of this possibility is an additional task
for future research.
Finally, we recognize limitations of our exam-
ination. Delegation is a subjective employee
measure aggregated to the workplace level.
While the alternative measures from the man-
agement survey provide some comfort, we
recognize that an objective employee measure
may provide additional insight. Also, we have
not modeled or tested a multilevel hierarchy of
owners, managers, and workers nor have we
controlled for endogenous incentive schemes.
Despite these open questions, we provide various
alternative measures of delegation and confirm
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the robustness of our results to a large number of
sensitivity checks, thus establishing an important
contribution on which further work can build.
APPENDIX A
We extend our baseline model to incorporate incentive
pay. We follow Aghion and Tirole (1997) by assuming there
are only two relevant projects yielding nonnegative payoffs
to P and A. Specifically, P reaps payoff B> 0 from one of
these two projects and zero from the other. Similarly, A’s
benefit is b> 0 from one of the two relevant projects and
zero from the other. The degree of congruence is represented
by the probability a=β∈ (0, 1] that both P and A prefer
the same project. Incentive pay is introduced through the
assumption that A receives wage w≥ 0 if P’s payoff is B and
zero otherwise. Suppose also thatw<B andw< b (if the latter
assumption is violated, wage incentives are so strong that
A always recommends P’s preferred project—i.e., incentives
are aligned). In this context, the payoffs under integration and
delegation become
(A1) unp = E · (B − w) + (1 − E) e · a (B − w) − c (I)
(A2) unA = E · (w + ab) + (1 − E) e · (b + aw) − g (e, I)
(A3) udp = e · a (B − w) + (1 − e)E · (B − w) − c (I)
(A4) udA = e · (b + aw) + (1 − e)E · (w + ab) − g (e, I) .
In the case of integration, A chooses e to maximize
unA in Equation (A2) implying the first-order condition
(1−E) · (b+ aw)−∂g/∂e= 0, which yields the interior
solution:Q8
(A5) e∗ (I,w) = ((1 − E) (b + aw) I) ∕ρ.
Since ∂e*/∂I > 0 and ∂e*/∂w> 0, both training and mon-
etary incentives can now be used by the employer as alter-
native instruments to increase A’s effort contribution. Antici-
pating Equation (A5), P sets w and I so as to maximize unp in
Equation (A1) subject to A’s participation constraint. Letting
μ3 denote the multiplier of this constraint in the associated
Lagrangian (L3), we can write the first-order conditions:
∂L3∕∂I = (1 − E) · a (B − w) ·
(
∂e∗∕∂I
)
− c′ (I)(A6)
+ μ3
(
∂unA(e
∗ (Iw) , I,w)∕∂I
)
≤ 0 ,
(
∂L3∕∂I
)
· I = 0
∂L3∕∂w = (1 − E) ·a (B − w) ·
(
∂e∗∕∂w
)
−
[
E+ (1 − E) ae∗
](A7)
+ μ3
(
∂unA(e
∗ (Iw) , I,w)∕∂w
)
≤ 0 ,
(
∂L3∕∂w
)
· w = 0
(A8)
∂L3∕∂μ3 = unA
(
e∗ (Iw) , I,w
)
− u ≥ 0,
(
∂L3∕∂μ3
)
· μ3 = 0
where ∂unA∕∂I = (1 − E)
2 (b + aw)2 ∕2ρ > 0 and ∂unA∕∂w
= E +
[
(1 − E)2 (b + aw) aI
]
∕ρ > 0. The principal’s choices
of I and w balance the marginal benefit associated with
increased worker effort against the marginal cost resulting
from increased training and wage expenditures, respectively,
while also taking into account that higher values of w and I
raise A’s utility (thus making it easier to satisfy the latter’s
participation constraint). Solving Equations (A6) to (A8)
yields the intensity of training (In) and wage incentives (wn)
which can then be substituted back into Equation (A5) to
derive A’s effort (en) for the case of integration.
Similarly, under delegation A maximizes udA in
Equation (A4) with respect to e and the first-order condition
b(1− aE)+ (a−E)w−∂g/∂e= 0 implies the interior solution:
(A9) ê (I,w) = [b (1 − aE) + (a − E)w] · I
ρ
.
A direct comparison of Equations (A5) and (A9) reveals
that ê (I,w) > e∗ (I,w) when incentives are not aligned (i.e.,
for w< b). Given the levels of training and wage, A is rela-
tively more willing to provide effort under delegation (as in
the case without incentive pay). Since ∂ê∕∂I > ∂e∗∕∂I and
∂ê∕∂w < ∂e∗∕∂w, the positive impact of training on effort is
relatively stronger under delegation but the positive impact of
monetary incentives on effort is relatively stronger under inte-
gration. Moreover, for a<E (i.e., when the probability that P
andA prefer the same project is lower than the probability that
P becomes informed) an increase in w reduces A’s marginal
benefit from effort provision and thus weakens his incentives
to become informed himself (∂ê∕∂w < 0).
Anticipating Equation (A9), P now selects the levels of
w and I that maximize udp in Equation (A3) subject to A’s
participation constraint. If we denote by μ4 the multiplier of
this constraint in the associated Lagrangian (L4), we get the
following first-order conditions:
∂L4∕∂I = (a − E) (B − w) ·
(
∂ê∕∂I
)
− c′ (I)(A10)
+ μ4
(
∂udA (̂e (Iw) , I,w)∕∂I
)
≤ 0,
(
∂L4∕∂I
)
· I = 0
∂L4∕∂w = (a − E) (B − w) ·
(
∂ê∕∂w
)
−
[
E + (a − E) ê
](A11)
+ μ4
(
∂udA (̂e (Iw) , I,w)∕∂w
)
≤ 0,
(
∂L4∕∂w
)
· w = 0
(A12)
∂L4∕∂μ4 = udA
(
ê (Iw) , I,w
)
− u ≥ 0,
(
∂L4∕∂μ4
)
· μ4 = 0.
Again, P optimally selects I and w by taking into account
their impact on A’s effort, the marginal cost resulting from
increased training and wage expenditures as well as the
need to keep A’s participation constraint satisfied. Solving
Equations (A10) to (A12) yields the levels of training (Id) and
wage (wd) under delegation, which can then be used to com-
pute worker effort (ed) from Equation (A9). In principle, the
outcome (Id ,wd , ed) can be compared to (In,wn, en) as already
done in the main body of the article without the presence of
incentive pay. While we leave such a thorough investigation
of the relationship between delegation, training, and incentive
pay as an open question for future research, in Table 10 of the
main paper (columns 1–4), we examine the presence of high-
powered incentives (individual payment by results or merit
pay) or not. The results show that delegation has a large and
significant impact on training only for establishments with the
higher powered incentive pay.
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APPENDIX B
TABLE B1
Descriptive Statistics of All Variables
Variable WERS 2004 WERS 2011 Panel 2004–2011
M SD. M SD M SD
Log number of employees 2.640 0.918 2.667 0.885 3.403 0.942
Workplace operates more than 5 years 0.844 0.363 0.867 0.340 0.955 0.207
Part of a larger organization 0.589 0.492 0.508 0.500 0.552 0.498
Single independent workplace 0.390 0.488 0.473 0.500 0.438 0.497
UK owned/controlled (predominantly UK owned 51% or more) 0.861 0.346 0.874 0.332 0.894 0.308
% of employees using computers 0.523 0.403 0.607 0.398 51.762 39.023
% of female employees 0.524 0.324 0.525 0.319 0.573 0.314
% of part-time employees 0.330 0.302 0.304 0.301 0.406 0.312
% union membership 0.083 0.214 0.037 0.134 0.057 0.157
% of employees on fixed-term contract 0.040 0.157 0.066 0.206 0.047 0.163
% of employees on temporary contract 0.015 0.069 0.014 0.077 0.011 0.045
% of employees who quitted last year 0.179 0.215 0.112 0.145 0.153 0.191
% of employees dismissed/redundant last year 0.027 0.069 0.029 0.069 0.038 0.094
% of employees with “O” levels, grades D–E 0.108 0.155 0.122 0.194 0.131 0.175
% of employees with “O” levels, grades A–C 0.197 0.201 0.325 0.290 0.251 0.214
% of employees with “A” levels 0.107 0.150 0.113 0.156 0.117 0.169
% of employees with first degree (BA, BSc, BEd, etc.) 0.093 0.143 0.137 0.197 0.105 0.132
% of employees with higher degree (MSc, MA, MBA, PhD) 0.025 0.088 0.042 0.113 0.022 0.063
% of employees with other academic qualification 0.281 0.226 0.190 0.228 0.243 0.203
% of managers/senior officials 0.142 0.108 0.168 0.117 0.113 0.075
% of professional staff 0.046 0.132 0.082 0.182 0.059 0.142
% of technical staff 0.057 0.148 0.094 0.197 0.062 0.153
% of sales staff 0.244 0.348 0.180 0.300 0.228 0.344
% of operative and assembly staff 0.091 0.212 0.072 0.191 0.076 0.187
% of clerical and secretarial staff 0.131 0.200 0.112 0.178 0.112 0.187
% of craft and skilled staff 0.098 0.226 0.077 0.182 0.077 0.170
% of personal service staff 0.077 0.232 0.116 0.280 0.160 0.315
Largest occupational group: professional 0.048 0.215 0.082 0.274 0.059 0.236
Largest occupational group: technical 0.063 0.244 0.116 0.321 0.079 0.270
Largest occupational group: administrative 0.106 0.308 0.098 0.298 0.088 0.284
Largest occupational group: skilled 0.125 0.330 0.106 0.308 0.112 0.315
Largest occupational group: caring, leisure 0.098 0.297 0.144 0.351 0.193 0.395
Largest occupational group: sales 0.296 0.457 0.234 0.424 0.256 0.437
Largest occupational group: operatives 0.129 0.336 0.102 0.303 0.097 0.296
Payment by result 0.280 0.449 0.194 0.395 0.217 0.413
Merit pay 0.077 0.267 0.135 0.342 0.097 0.296
Profit-related pay 0.343 0.475 0.314 0.464 0.318 0.466
Employee share schemes (SIP, SAYE, EMI, CSOP, other) 0.120 0.325 0.091 0.288 0.122 0.328Q9
Few competitors 0.334 0.472 0.396 0.489 0.355 0.479
Many competitors 0.602 0.490 0.578 0.494 0.598 0.491
Current state of the market: growing 0.467 0.499 0.309 0.462 0.353 0.478
Current state of the market: mature 0.238 0.426 0.200 0.400 0.220 0.414
Current state of the market: declining 0.136 0.343 0.152 0.359 0.153 0.360
Current state of the market: turbulent 0.159 0.365 0.339 0.473 0.272 0.445
Manufacturing 0.130 0.336 0.111 0.314 0.079 0.270
Utilities (electricity, gas, and water) 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000
Construction 0.047 0.213 0.053 0.224 0.038 0.193
Wholesale and retail 0.296 0.457 0.263 0.441 0.340 0.474
Hotels and restaurants 0.081 0.273 0.094 0.292 0.070 0.255
Transport and communication 0.049 0.216 0.037 0.190 0.028 0.165
Financial services 0.057 0.232 0.004 0.063 0.000 0.000
Other businesses 0.161 0.368 0.196 0.397 0.136 0.343
Education 0.009 0.096 0.048 0.213 0.021 0.145
Health 0.108 0.311 0.133 0.340 0.214 0.411
North East 0.045 0.208 0.048 0.214 0.075 0.263
North West 0.111 0.315 0.099 0.298 0.215 0.411
East Midlands 0.075 0.263 0.071 0.258 0.046 0.209
West Midlands 0.122 0.328 0.110 0.313 0.123 0.328
East Anglia 0.048 0.215 0.053 0.223 0.030 0.170
South East 0.302 0.460 0.310 0.463 0.284 0.451
South West 0.078 0.268 0.119 0.324 0.099 0.299
Wales 0.033 0.178 0.031 0.172 0.017 0.128
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TABLE B1
Continued
WERS 2004 WERS 2011 Panel 2004–2011
Variable M SD. M SD M SD
Scotland 0.092 0.289 0.089 0.285 0.052 0.223
Owner-manager firm 0.204 0.403 0.245 0.430 0.209 0.407
Management gives employees information about investment plans 0.482 0.499 0.497 0.500 0.517 0.500
Training intensity: no time 0.261 0.439 0.194 0.395 0.211 0.408
Training intensity: less than 1 day 0.050 0.218 0.047 0.211 0.065 0.247
Training intensity: 1 to less than 2 days 0.193 0.395 0.199 0.400 0.239 0.427
Training intensity: 2 to less than 5 days 0.273 0.445 0.334 0.472 0.255 0.436
Training intensity: 5 to less than 10 days 0.114 0.318 0.128 0.334 0.132 0.338
Training intensity: 10 days or more 0.108 0.310 0.095 0.294 0.096 0.295
Dummy for missing firm age 0.042 0.200 0.026 0.160 0.013 0.113
Dummy for missing % union membership 0.039 0.193 0.049 0.215 0.073 0.260
Dummy for missing % of employees on fixed-term contract 0.009 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dummy for missing % of employees on temporary contract 0.006 0.077 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.013
Dummy for missing % of employees quitted last year 0.040 0.197 0.023 0.149 0.034 0.181
Dummy for missing % of employees dismissed/redundant last year 0.041 0.199 0.019 0.138 0.022 0.147
Observations 994 1,012 474
Notes:Means and standard deviations for each variable are reported for the two cross sections and the panel samples. Means
are weighted using workplace weights. Means for variables with missing observations are estimated on nonmissing observations.
TABLE B2
Instrumental Variable (IV) Results: Panel Data 2004–2011, Alternative Measures of Delegation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Discretion Involvement
Principal Component
Analysis
With Workplace
Fixed Effects
With Workplace
Fixed Effects
With Workplace
Fixed Effects
First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage
Delegation Training Delegation Training Delegation Training
Delegation 0.545**
(0.247)
0.376**
(0.189)
0.265**
(0.117)
Instrument for delegation 15.883***
(2.348)
12.246***
(1.574)
9.324***
(1.452)
F-statistic (H0:
instrument is weak)
128.44
p val.= .000
142.21
p val.= .000
95.42
p val.= .000
Observations 474 474 474 474 474 474
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No No No No No No
Workplace characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workforce characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Largest occupational
group dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PRP dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Competition dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Missing dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the proportion of experienced employees in the largest occupational group who have been
given time off from their normal daily work to undertake training over the last 12months. In columns 1 and 2, delegation is
measured from the Management Questionnaire from the following question: “Using the scale on this card, to what extent would
you say that the largest occupational group here have discretion over how they do their work?” “A lot,” “Some,” Little,” “None.”
We code as delegation if managers replied “A lot.” In columns 3 and 4, delegation is measured from themanagement questionnaire
from the following question: “Using the scale on this card, to what extent would you say that the largest occupational group have
involvement in decisions over how their work is organized?” “A lot,” “Some,” “Little,” “None.”We code as delegation if managers
replied “A lot.” In columns 5 and 6, delegation is constructed using the first principal component of discretion and involvement.
For reasons of brevity, we only present estimates of the variable of interest. Other controls are those shown in column 4 of Table 3
in the main paper, as well as a year dummy. The estimates for the rest of the covariates are available upon request. Bootstrap
standard errors using 1,000 replications with replacement and clustered at industry cells are reported in parentheses. Estimates
are weighted using workplace weights.
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1.Q10
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